MERKAVA TANKS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE MERKAVA PROGRAM MANAGEMENT MAY 1989

Historical Background

The War of Independence was, in effect, an infantry war. Operations of both Israel and the enemy were waged by infantry formations. The few tanks deployed played no decisive role. Israel at that time had 15 tanks, and the Arabs had 45. Mobile and armored forces in the War of Independence were mainly equipped with half-tracks, armored personnel carriers, and armored vehicles with light guns. Israeli forces had 280 half-tracks and 20 armored vehicles with guns. Arab forces had 620 ajrmored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, of which 180 carried guns.

The Sinai Campaign of 1956 was characterized by mobile, armored warfare. Israel deployed 200 tanks in Sinai, versus 150 tanks deployed by the Egyptians.

Since the Sinai Campaign, the land war between Israel and the surrounding Arab nations has become a war of highly mobile and armored formations. A total of 2500 tanks were deployed during the Six-Day War by Israel and the enemy. 6200 tanks engaged in combat during the Yom-Kippur war. Since the Sinai Campaign, thousands of tanks have been destroyed in battle.

Today, the tank is central to the art of war, and is considered the primary decisive factor on the modern land battlefield.

Prior to the Sinai Campaign Egypt received, within the framework of the "Chechoslovakian Arms Deal", 300 Soviet tanks and tank destroyers, including the Stalin-3 and T-34 tanks and SU-100 tank destroyers. This was considered an impressive addition to the Egyptian armored fleet, which at that time numbered some 430 western armored vehicles, of various types.

Within the scope of the Middle-East arms race, Israeli weaponry was always inferior in both qualitative and quantitative aspects. From France we acquired Sherman tanks and AMX-13 tanks (not really tanks but rather light tank destroy­ers), while the Arabs obtained, with no problems, new and modern tanks from both east and west. We were forced to be satisfied with "junk”: old and inoper­able tanks, second world war vintage Shermans, British Centurions, and obsolete American M-48’s.

Not a single country agreed to sell new tanks to us. It is still not clear why some countries, occasionally, did allow us to buy new and modern means of bat­tle, such as jet fighter planes, but persisted in their refusal to sell us new tanks.

Given the need, we were forced to learn the technologies of armor, in order to rehabilitate the obsolete metal hulks which we had purchased through programs of rebuilding, regunning and engine replacements.

The race between ourselves and the Arabs now became a direct confrontation between new western and Soviet MBT’s fielded by the Arab armies and old, re­built and improvised tanks fielded by Israel.

In the 1960s the Arabs were about to obtain T-62 tanks from Soviet Russia. This was the most modern operational Main Battle Tank (МВТ) of its time, equipped with a high powered 115 mm cannon. Israel stood helpless. It was clear that no improvisations or rejuvenations to tanks of the 1940s and 1950s would suffice to ensure the continued security, and indeed the existence, of the State of Israel.

At that time, in 1966, to our delight, England came forward with a dramatically historic proposal. The British needed money in order to complete the develop­ment of their new tank of the future, the Chieftain, with its 120 mm cannon. This tank was designed to be the strongest and most modern in the west. In view of their financial constraints they proposed a "package deal". According to this deal, we would buy hundreds of obsolete Centurion tanks.

They, in ex­change, would allow us to participate in the final stages of Chieftain develop­ment, would sell us Chieftains, and would help us build, in Israel, an as­sembly line for Chieftains. We were of course overjoyed. We saw it as being an .ideal solution to the grim and unacceptable predictions regarding the middle-eastern armor balance from both quantitative and qualitative points of view.

Our cooperation with the British lasted for about three years. Two prototypes of the Chieftain tank were delivered to Israel. We devoted ourselves to their improvement and final development in close cooperation with British officers and engineers, who worked with us in Israel.

However, Arab states intervened. They threatened Great Britain with sanctions, with pulling their monetary reserves out of British banks, and other actions. Demonstrations were held in Arab capitals and mobs attacked British embassies. In November 1969, Britain folded under pressure, and withdrew from its Chief­tain deal with Israel.

The development, design and planning efforts of three years went down the drain - and we were back at square one, with time lost which could not be retrieved.

In memoirs published in 1977 by Richard Crossman, a minister in the 1964-1970 British government, we discovered that the British government not only reneged on its commitments to us for objective reasons, but also deceived us by con­cealing the fact, for a whole year, that it had no intention of fulfilling its commitments concerning the Chieftain. Moreover it had pressured the US Govern­ment, if approached, into refusing the sale of American tanks to Israel.

In view of this development, we considered the possibility of developing and manufacturing "made-in-Israel" tanks.

It was clear that a weapon system of primary importance was at stake, vital to our security, but which, had been refused to Israel by all nations. No change in this attitude was foreseen.

The question which arose, therefore, was not whether we should engage in devel­opment and manufacture of a homemade tank, but whether we would be capable of achieving the high levels of industrial and technological expertise required to succeed in such a project. To this was added the question of whether we would be capable of doing so at a reasonable price and without disrupting the Israeli economy.

In order to answer these questions, it was decided to conduct a study, presided by Major General Israel Tai. The study was conducted by experts of the Ministry of Defence and of the Ordnance Corps, and was designed to answer two essential questions:

a. Would Israel be capable of planning, designing and manufacturing a Main Battle Tank from the point of view of technological know-how and industrial infrastructure?

b. Is there any economic sense in such a project - does it insure economic viability in the broad sense, to the economy of Israel?

 

Findings

Findings of the study were, on the whole, positive. Israel would be capable of developing and establishing an infrastructure for the manufacture of tanks, which would be economically feasible from the point of view of the national economy. In addition, the proposed Israeli tank would compare favorably with others, would meet the specific requirements of the IDF, and the specific needs of the middle-eastern theatre of war.

Staffs of the Ministry of Defence and the IDF GHQ studied the findings, dis­cussed them, and decided to proceed with the program. Moshe Dayan, then Minister of Defence, wanted the final decision to be taken from the perspective of national interest. He took the s and that needs of the economy be taken into account and that the final decision be based on economic considerations only. He thus handed over responsibility for the final decision to the Ministry of Finance. Pinhas Sapir, who was then the Minister of Finance, delegated Moshe Zanbar to study the MOD study.

After three months of further study, a meeting was convened, chaired by Mr. Sapir and attended by Moshe Dayan, Haim Bar-Lev, then Chief of the IDF General Staff, senior staff of the MOD, members of the IDF GHQ, and experts from the Ministry of Finance. All participants supported the program, and a decision was taken, namely: the State of Israel would devel­op a tank and would establish a tank industry for the production of tanks for the IDF, and in the future, for export. This decision was taken in August 1970.

 

ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE

The original plan was for the development of a tank to be based primarily on existing systems and assemblies. But even from the first years of development the need arose, in view of know-how restrictions, technological reasons and operational requirements which developed over time, to develop an entirely new tank which would be based on both original and new assemblies. The development task was modified accordingly.

The need to shorten development time gave rise to an abbreviated development process, while knowingly taking risks, which later became known as the "tele­scopic development^" process. This method is characterized by the start of se­rial production, based on prototypes, before completion of all development and demonstration stages. This is prior to the finalizing of production files.

In order to reduce the investments needed for the establishment and management of a tank manufacturing industry, we decided not to form a new, large scale organization, with the backup services required for such a project (procure­ment, inventories, legal and economic service units, etc.). It was decided that the Project Administration would utilize existing MOD/IDF infrastructures such as Equipment Center facilities, spare part inventories, procurement and manu­facturing controls, MOD legal advisor staff, MOD economic advisor staff, and others.

It was further decided to utilize the industrial infrastructures existing in the IDF, the civilian and governmental military industries, and to expand the manufacturing potential of existing plant where necessary. To the extent pos­sible inflated bureaucracies, or the creation of new industries would be avoided. It was now decided that the existing IDF basic tank depot would be utilized as the tank’s final assembly plant. In addition, two hundred industri­al plants would be upgraded with new knowledge and capabilities, as required for the manufacture of the thousands of parts, assemblies and systems, needed for the Merkava tank.

 

THE MERKAVA GENERATIONS

 

A policy of regional distribution of manufacturing facilities throughout Israel was evolved, including development regions, with maximum utilization of civil­ian enterprises and no monopoly for the military industries.

It was decided that any technological knowledge which was lacking would be acquired in part from abroad, and in part self-developed within the defense establishment, the industrial establishment and by Israeli research institutes.

The first Mark-1 Merkava tanks were supplied to the IDF in April, 1979, nearly nine years after the decision to produce the Merkava tank was taken.

The Merkava tank has been designed in accordance with experience gained from IDF armored battles in all Israel’s wars since the Sinai Campaign.

The Merkava Mk-1 is unique in its basic concept, common to all generations of the Merkava, according to which the armor and survivability of the tank are its basic features. The tank’s protection is based on all-round spaced ballistic armor, and deployment of the tank systems around the crew, thus utilizing basic elements and systems of the tank to protect the crew and ammunition, in addi­tion to their specific functions. The most striking example of this concept is placement of the power pack (engine and transmission) at the front of the tank.

Other factors contributing to the Merkava’s survivability are: - Low profile when in firing position.

a. Elimination of flammable materials from the crew compartments.

b. Storage of main gun ammunition under the turret ring, well to the rear of the hull, in heat-resistant containers.

The Merkava Mk-1 tank participated with a high degree of success, in the 1982 war in Lebanon. Its production continued up to 1983, when the IDF Armor Corps began to receive the Merkava Mk-2 tank.

Lessons learned from the operation of the Mk-1 tanks were applied to the Mk-2 tanks, mainly in the following:

a. Improved mobility.

b. Improved fire control system.

c. Improved special armor.

d. Internal 60mm mortar.

The production of Mk-2 tanks will continue until the end of 1989, at which time Mk-3 tanks will start to come off the production line.

The Merkava Mk-3, scheduled to enter service in the IDF at the beginning of 1990, is a sophisticated tank. The difference between the Mk-3 and the Mk-2 is in essence and not in degree. All systems and assemblies are new, and all, except for the engine, are of Israeli design and production.

Among the prominent features of the Merkava Mk-3 are the new and unique suspen­sion system, the high powered engine, the powerful main gun, and, especially, a new and unique concept of armor. Ballistic protection is provided by special armor modules, which are attached to the tank by bolts. These can be easily replaced whenever better ballistic technology is introduced. Thus, the tank will remain "young" for ever.

 

TECHNO-ECONOMIC RESULTS

Industrial and Technological Development

The project caused a considerable expansion of the Israeli industrial and tech­nological potential:

a. Modern technologies were initiated in all aspects related to the manufac­ture of tanks, including: welding and machining of large armor bodies (Army Tank Depot), casting of ballistic steels (Urdan), manufacture of cannons (IMI), electro-optical industries, including laser technologies (El-Op, Elbit, and other plants). Most of the parts, assemblies and systems of the Mark-3 Merkava tank were developed in Israel and are locally manufactured, except the engine, which is imported from the United States.

b. Technologies were developed in Israel for the manufacture of modern and original ballistic protection. Only a few countries, worldwide, possess similar capabilities in this field.

c. Special technologies were developed for the storage and the isolation of ammunition.

d. Breakthroughs were achieved and new, original techniques were invented.

 

Contribution of the Merkava Industries

The industries which were developed for the Merkava contributed to the upgrad­ing of all types of tanks and armored vehicles used by the IDF, and allowed the export of a wide variety of technologies, assemblies and spare parts:

a. The Merkava industrial capability refurbished hundreds of damaged tanks and self-propelled guns which had been damaged during the wars.

b. Merkava technologies are utilized for the development of new, state-of- the-art weapon systems.

c. Merkava technologies and systems were applied to other IDF armored vehicles and to other weapon systems.

d. The import of tanks to Israel was stopped, and manufacture of spare parts for IDF armored vehicles, by local industrial plants participating in the Merkava project, was considerably expanded and enhanced.

e. In addition to their contribution in halting the import of tanks, the plants involved in Merkava manufacture are successfully exporting technolo­gies, parts and systems worth tens of millions of dollars every year.

 

Costs

The January 1989 production cost of a Merkava tank (for tanks manufactured and assembled for the IDF), in US dollars, excluding VAT, is approximately:

Merkava Mk-1 - $1.8 million

Merkava Mk-2 - $1.9 million

Merkava Mk-3 - $2.3 million

 

Added Value

The added value calculated for the Merkava Mk-3 is approximately 65%.

 

Employment

The project provides employment for some 3,000 workers, in some 200 plants throughout Israel.

 

THE MERKAVA TANK GENERATIONS COMPARISON

Parameter	Mark 1	Mark-2	Mark-3
Weight (tons)	63	63	62
Main Gun (mm)	105	105	120
Main Gun Ammunition	62 rounds	62 rounds	50 rounds
Machine Guns	3	3	3
60mm Mortar	External	Internal	Internal
Engine Power (horse-power)	900	900	1200
Transmission	Semi-automatic	Automatic, elec­tronic control	Automatic, elec­tronic control .
Suspension System	1st generation	1st generation	2nd generation
Fire Control System	Electronic Computer Laser rangefinder Night vision system	Modern electronic computer Modern laser rangefinder Modern night vision system	Modern electronic computer Modern laser rangefinder Modern night vision system Stabilized verti­cal & horizontal line of sight
Turret Control System	Electro-hydraulic	Electro-hydraulic	Electrical and Electronic
Ballistic Protection	All-round spaced armor	Combined spaced armor and add­on special armor	Modular special armor
Ammunition - Survivability	Heat resistant	Heat resistant	Heat resistant and resistant to chain detonation
NBC System	Over pressurized fighting compart­ment	Over pressurized fighting com­partment	High over pres­surized fighting compartment, central filter, crew air condi­tioning.
Electromagnetic Warning System	Elementary	Elementary	Improved