REGARDING THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE. BRADLEY VULNERABILITY TESTS

On Tuesday, 28 January 1986, General Thurman and other Army witnesses testified before the R&D Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The focus of the hearing was DOD testing. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the recent Bradley vulnerability tests were discussed as illustrative examples. Testimony included the issues of Bradley Fighting Vehicle employment and capabilities.

Witnesses in order of appearance:

Mr. Tony Battista, Professional Staff Member, HASC

LTG James Hol1ingsworth, USA Retired

Colonel James Burton, USAF OUSDRE

General Maxwell R. Thurman, VCSA

LTG Louis C. Wagner, DCSRDA

MG Edwin H. Burba, Jr., Commandant, USA Infantry School

BG Edwin S. Leland, CG, National Training Center

Colonel Robert Foley, ODCSOPS

SFC David D. Hermann, 2d Bn 41st Inf 2AD Fort Hood, Texas

 

General Thurman

We are faced with a significant mechanized armored threat, and we can only defeat the threat with leadership and maneuver warfare. There are two elements to maneuver warfare and they are applicable at the squad level, the company level, the division, or the corps level. Those two elements are fire suppression and maneuver.

In support of those elements, maneuver warfare requires agile, mobile, protected, and lethal forces. It requires around the clock, continuous operations capabilities, and it requires combined arms operations; infantry, armor, and artillery together. Maneuver warfare is the result of teamwork – equipment, organizations, individual soldiers, and leadership coming together effectively on the battlefield. One on one duels are not the way to beat an enemy that outnumbers you; whether it’s soldier to soldier, tank to tank, or fighting vehicle to fighting vehicle.

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle is the major addition and improvement for mechanized infantry. The Bradley has an on-board TOW anti-tank weapon effective up to 3,750 meters. It can kill Soviet tanks. It has a stabilized 25mm gun which kills the BMP, the Soviet fighting vehicle, at 2,000 meters. In addition it has a coax machine gun, a thermal sight, and a host of other features which таке it a premier fighting vehicle. The Bradley is not a battlefield taxi like the venerable M113. It is a potent weapons platform in its own right.

To put this in perspective, we used to have 370 M113s in the 3d Infantry Division in Germany. Now we have 370 Bradley Fighting Vehicles carrying 370 TOW launchers and 3,090 TOW missiles – capable of killing Soviet tanks to 3,750 meters depending on terrain. We now have 370 25mm guns that can kill and suppress BMP’s and troops out to 2,000 meters. And we have 370 night sights that permit continuous, around the clock operation. The Bradley improves force survivability and kills more of the threat than the older M113. In simple language, we win with the Bradley and we lose with the M113.

 

On the issue of how we employ the Bradley, we know first that the fighting vehicle must keep up with and accompany the Abrams tank across country. But it was not designed to operate like a tank. In the offense or defense, the enemy situation, terrain, and other factors dictate its tactical deployment. Our doctrine has been in place since 1978, but we continue to refine it. The more we use the fighting vehicle in Europe, at our posts, and at the National Training Center, the better fighting team we will become.

Survivability for a foot soldier or a fighting vehicle depends on agility, armor, and use of terrain. The foot soldier and the fighting vehicle dash across open ground to prevent exposure. Both depend on armor – a flak vest – laminate or Steel hulls. And both use terrain, crawling or operating in hull defilade to stay alive. Force survivability depends too on fire and maneuver, continuous operations, and firepower. The best way to survive is to kill the enemy before he shoots at you. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle is a quantum leap ahead in force survivability.

As the subject of this hearing is Bradley testing, l’d like to speak to some charts on the Army's testing of the Bradley, on what we've learned from that testing, and on what the future holds for testing.

The first chart is a reminder of the range of weapons aboard the Bradley.

This second chart makes the point that for eight years the Bradley has been subjected to rigorous testing. In the 1979 DT II alone, the vehicle was subjected to 251 separate criteria. During the initial production test in 1983, 321 items were tested. In ail, literally thousands of items have been tested, and the test results have been used to improve the weapon as well as to justify our confidence in it. Since the issue of vaporifics has been discussed, this chart also shows results of vaporifics testing.  

On this chart it should be noted first Chat the Bradley met all of its design requirements during vulnerability testing in 1980. Now there were still areas of uncertainty and, as depicted in the center of the chart, these led to the 1985 vulnerability tests.

I ’d like to spend some time setting the record straight on these tests. First, the testing has been useful. It was done responsibly and correctly, and the results have been open for discussion. The test design plan was developed jointly with OSD and approved by OSD. Both OSD and GAO observed the tests. No aspect of the tests or the reports was conducted without the oversight of the DOD testing community. It was open and above board – and we ail agree on the data base.

Now there have been some differences along the way. For example, the Army takes issue with testing for things we already know. We knew, for instance, that the tests depicted at the bottom of the chart would result in catastrophic damage. There is no need to test for that.  

While there were 10 shots against a fully loaded vehicle, there were a total of 68 shots against vehicle and component configurations. The chart above shows the ten fully-uploaded shots. Some shots were executed statically (that is to say near to the point of entry) while some were fired dynamically (from a distance). While we have been criticized for not firing random shots, random shots cannot produce predictable, usable data. We were testing for specific outcomes, so the shots had to hit their targets.

The next two charts describe some conclusions and some actions we are taking.

 

 

As indicated in earlier testimony, there have been differences in interpretation of test results. Analysts can and will disagree. That can be healthy. It can lead to the best analysis and to the best decisions. On shot number 38, for instance, the OSD analyst says there were five casualties and the Army says there were three. The OSD analyst says a ruptured eardrum produces a casualty, and we say not so. In fact, General Wagner, here on my right had his eardrum ruptured in combat in Vietnam and went on to win the Distinguished Service Cross in that action. The OSD analysts say too that exposure to halon fire extinguishers may produce toxic effects on the crew. The Army Surgeon General says not so, and we’d be happy to hear from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs on the matter.

Analysts can also disagree on the product improvements to be made, but we can uniformly agree that they ought to be made. Product improvement is the norm, and it is certainly nothing new to this committee. Congress approved $23 .6M for Bradley product improvement in 1986, and the Army will ask for $19.9M for product improvements in the 1987 budget. Just as you have supported product improvements which made the world’s best tank, the M1, the new world’s best tank, the M1A1, we need your continuing support for product improvement on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. We vitally need the same sustained production of the Bradley. With it, we win. When it’s product improved it will do even better.

 

 

Let me leave you with some key points. Your Army today is trained to fight a doctrine of maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare requires that the armored battle be fought by a combined arms team: tanks, infantry, and supporting forces. Those tanks and infantry must be able to perform tactical tasks together on the battlefield – to complement each other and, by the mutual interaction of their differing capabilities , to whip the enemy. To win we need a fighting vehicle, not a battlefield taxi. With a fighting vehicle which complements the capabilities of our Abrams tank, we kill more enemy before he has a chance to kill us. We know how to apply the doctrine with the equipment. We have a solid doctrinal base which, as we learn more about the Bradley, we are refining. We shall continue to do so. We always have and always will – and you should expect us to improve as we go.

Survivability of the Bradley is not solely a function of inches of armor. It is a function of agility, firepower, mobility, tactics , the presence of other members of the combined arms team, and a 24-hour a day war fighting capability. The Bradley as a fighting vehicle has this in abundance – today, and we need it – today. «

But we can take the Bradley better and more survivable. The so-called “survivability tests" are great! We have learned from them. We shall continue to learn from them. It’s probable that we will continue to have experts disagree on interpretations of the data. Even the product improvements that flow from the test results will provoke honest discussion that will lead to the best solution for product improvement.

Finally, ail in this room and those associated with the Bradley – those who have supported it over the years through their votes, those who wrestle with how to fight it, those who test it to take it better, those who write about it to educate our public – everybody, should feel pretty good about their role in having this fine vehicle in the hands of the troops. The troops obviously feel pretty good about the vehicle we have given them. These men are our soldiers and they need this fighting vehicle in their units and in the units of their comrades on either flank. We are ail motivated to improve survivability of both equipment and troops. That’s the American value System! People are our most precious assets. Remember – We need the fighting vehicle. With it we win. Without it we lose!

Drawing from his following summary of Bradley tactical doctrine, MG Burba described to the Subcommittee the tactics and possible deployment scenarios for the Bradley.

 

MG Burba

Defeat of an enemy force, superior in numbers and equipped with weapons of equivalent technology, must be accomplished through maneuver warfare. The essence of such warfare embraces the avoidance of major frontal engagements where enemy combat power prevails and the initiation of friendly attacks along lines of least expectation and resistance where the enemy’s combat power is emasculated and ours is subs tantia1ly enhanced. At the lowest levels , these tactics are referred to as fire and movement, at higher levels as firepower and maneuver, and at the highest levels as maneuver warfare.

To accomplish these indirect tactics, infantry heavy forces fix or at least control the movement of enemy first echelon forces while artillery, air and engineer units support them and freeze second echelon forces through fire interdiction and barrier operations. While the enemy’s attention is on these fixing, interdiction and barrier actions, tank heavy units, accompanied by protecting infantry, attack his vulnerable flanks and rear before he can react. Such operations unhinge enemy tactical integrity and provide opportunities for attack deep in the enemy’s rear by division and corps constituted operational reserves.

A more precise snapshot of the maneuver aspects of these combined arms operations displays enemy’s target acquisition and weapons Systems, offensive formations, and defensive entrenchments facing in one direction, and friendly attacks emanating from a different direction, normally the flank or rear. Such attacks avoid the enemy’s superior strength while concentrating friendly strength against his weaknesses. Flank and rear attacks quickly lead to destruction or paralysis of the enemy’s command posts and his artillery, aviation, engineer and logistical support units. Without having taken on the enemy’s superior combat force, friendly forces defeat him from within by desynchronizing his command and control and depriving his combat forces of critical firepower, maneuver and logistical support.

As indicated, there are two maneuver force underpinnings that allow these tactics to succeed. First, the enemy’s first echelon force movement must be fixed or at least controlled. Secondly, an agile maneuver force must be able to react more quickly than the enemy. The tank is clearly the preeminent weapons and mobility System for the maneuver force and it has always performed its role well. The weapons of the infantry’s M113 carrier and organic troops have neither the range nor lethality to perform the fixing function. Previously, tanks had to be used to execute this role and, thus, were deprived of the role that they do best–maneuver. When tanks were previously used to fix the enemy, our forces were deprived of adequate maneuver elements and were forced into attrition warfare. The enemy’s superior numbers normally presented him victory. Tank heavy forces are too precious to be used as the predominant fixing force.

With the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the infantry now has the vehicle it needs to fix the enemy, freeing tank heavy forces for maneuver and, thus, providing the Army with the opportunity to conduct maneuver warfare. Not only can the Bradley’s TOW missiles destroy enemy tanks, its 25-mm Bushmaster can destroy or suppress its Soviet counterpart, the BMP, and its coaxial machinegun can destroy or suppress dismounted infantry. The range of these Bradley weapons Systems also allows the infantry to occupy long range, dispersed, mutually supporting positions, arrayed in depth, on flanks along likely avenues of approach throughout the battle area. These positions deny the enemy complete use of his combat power by avoiding the directional orientation of his target acquisition equipment and weapons Systems and brings the majority of our forces’ combat power to bear on his weaknesses, the sides of his tanks and the flanks of his formations.

 

 

There are other premiums. The range of these weapons Systems allows an extension of the umbilical cord between the infantry vehicles and the dismount elements. Previously, the location of both the vehicles and dismount element was a compromise between positions that would optimize each element. The positions neither completely favored the dismount element nor the vehicles. Now, with the longer range weapons, vehicle dash speed, and improved armament and optics, both the vehicles and dismounted element can be placed in optimized positions. Furthermore, such positional flexibility allows dismounted infantry the opportunity for infiltration and ambush attacks and reverse slope and checkerboard defenses, "miss direction" operations implicit in maneuver warfare.

Once the enemy force’s movement is either fixed or controlled, a tank-heavy force can quickly maneuver into its flanks and rear. The Bradley infantry also has important roles with the tanks during this maneuver. It performs reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance, clears restricted terrain, protects at night and breaches obstacles. Further, it mops up bypassed enemy, seizes key terrain to maintain the momentum of the tank attack and, importantly, destroys and suppresses enemy anti-tank weapons. Tanks alone are unable to perform these roles. The M113 armored personnel carrier’s lack of cross country speed and agility prevents it from accompanying the tanks and its lack of mounted firepower to destroy enemy tanks and fighting vehicles compromises the maneuver force. Bradley infantry can effectively fight tanks, BMP’s, and other armored vehicles, thus allowing brigade and battalion commanders to mass tanks for maneuver. As can be seen, Bradley infantry is as critical to the maneuver element as it is to the fixing force.

Concern has been expressed that Bradley dismounted strength has been reduced to unacceptable levels that prevent it from performing the roles just discussed. Even when the M113 personnel carrier was structured with an eleven (11) man squad, there were only 5 maneuver soldiers. Five members of the squad were dismounted to perform fire support because the gunner with the 50 caliber machinegun could not perform that role without substantial reinforcement. The current Bradley squad with its six dismount soldiers dedicated to maneuver can perform infantry dismount roles as well, if not better, than the five in the larger Ml 13 infantry squad.

Other concerns have been expressed relative to the Bradley’s capability to stay up with tanks during maneuver because of its light armor protection. The F15 aircraft is highly vulnerable to any ordnance that hits it; however, it derives its survivability from its speed, agility, and tactical employment. The same situation applies to the Bradley. Against light resistance by an enemy force such as a mechanized or tank platoon (3 or 4 vehicles) that is not dug in and does possess combined arms support, the Bradley can fight in the same combat formation with the tank.

During a medium resistance situation, where the friendly force is faced with a company sized element (10-15 vehicles) with combined arms elements supporting and dismounted elements in a hastily dug position, the Bradley is able to perform overwatch missions, suppressing and destroying targets to forces to fix the enemy, freeing tanks and other Bradleys to seize the initiative through maneuver and shock action – roles that are the basic underpinnings of maneuver warfare doctrine. In short, the Bradley, with its optimized firepower and mobility, working synergistically with the remainder of the combined arms force in the execution of a doctrine for which the force was designed, allows that force to win. Without the Bradley, the force frequently loses.