On August 7, 1973, by joint decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers No. 554‑172, the T‑72 tank was officially adopted into service with the Soviet Army. Before the collapse of the USSR, Uralvagonzavod and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant produced a total of 22,066 T‑72s in three different modifications, of which 17,831 were delivered to the Soviet Army. The tank was also licence‑built in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India.
This raises the key question: why did the USSR adopt a second “main” battle tank with characteristics virtually identical to those of the T‑64A, which had been introduced in the very same year? The answer is complex and is examined in detail in a four‑part study on the events of 1973 titled “History of Soviet Tank Building. The Pivotal Year 1973” (links are provided below). Archival research has revealed that falsification, lies and political intrigue played a decisive role in these events. The T‑64A was slandered with false claims about poor cross‑country performance on soft ground, insufficient cruising range, and the gun digging into the terrain, among other alleged defects. A letter from M. I. Maresev, head of the 7th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defence Industry, addressed to Soich and Morozov, confirms that the production of the T‑72 was officially legitimised on the basis of these contrived and fabricated design shortcomings.
In reality, the T‑64A was superior in flotation on weak soils, yet no comparative trials were ever conducted – tests were planned for 1973 but deliberately delayed until 1974 in order to give the T‑72 and T‑80 a chance under this false pretext. The T‑64A’s cruising range was no worse than the T‑72’s and actually exceeded that of the T‑80. The other accusations appear to have been dreamed up late at night after heavy drinking – for instance, the possibility of fires in the engine compartment was cited as a drawback, but which tank in the world is immune to such fires? Moreover, a larger mechanised ammunition rack holding 28 rounds was counted against the T‑64A, while they promoted an autoloader with only 22 rounds. As for engine failures, the T‑72 had no fewer than the T‑64A. The same absurd logic applied to the double standard: why was the inability to use all stored rounds in combat considered a critical flaw for the T‑64A, but not for the vaunted T‑80?
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