Рубрики

среда, 1 июня 2022 г.

FROM HALF-TRACK TO BRADLEY: EVOLUTION OF THE INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE

by Major Bruce R. Pirnie

Analysis Branch

U. S. Army Center of Military History Washington, D. C.

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During World War II, the American and German armies developed doctrine for armored infantry operating closely with tanks. Armored infantry might attack mounted or dismounted, using on-vehicle weapons for fire support. The infantry fighting vehicle evolved out of this war. Indeed, doctrine for armored infantry changed little after World War II. However, the world's major armies developed far more capable vehicles to implement it. The U.S. Army developed a series of vehicles, many experimental, that showed steady evolution from the M3 Half-Track of World War II to today's M2 Bradley.

During the immediate postwar period, the U. S. Army developed full-tracked infantry carriers with limited fighting ability, culminating in the M113. The Army was staffing the requirements document for a vehicle with far greater fighting capability, when the Soviets forged ahead with the BMP. By the 1970's, the U. S Army urgently needed to replace the M113. It was apparent that U.S. infantry equipped with this vehicle could not defeat Soviet motorized rifle troops with the BMP. In addition, the long-awaited XM1 main battle tank would be at risk unless it had better infantry support.  

Armor officers showed more enthusiasm for a vehicle with increased fighting^ capability than did infantry officers, who feared diminution of dismounted strength. Infantry officers emphasized that mounted infantry has little combat power. They tried to retain an armored infantry squad with two fire teams. However, they eventually accepted the Bradley configuration: one strong fire team plus a vehicle that acts as the second fire team.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense thought the new vehicle had to mount TOW. The Army initially argued that the same vehicle could not perform in the anti­armor role and still support dismounted infantry. However, the Army could find no better way to proliferate TOW within the existing force structure. Doctrinally, the Army continued to favor infantry support over the anti-armor role.

 

World War II

Definitions

Combined arms requires teamwork between tanks and infantry, each exerting its unique abilities for the common benefit of the team. If infantry is on foot, it cannot keep pace with tanks, nor even transport all the infantry's own weapons, including heavy machine guns. As a result, this infantry requires a vehicle offering some mix of cross-country mobility, armor protection, and firepower, if it is only a pintle-mounted machine gun. In the U.S. Army during World War II, this infantry was called "armored infantry," and later "mechanized infantry." The Germans speak of "Panzergrenadiere," while the Soviet term translates into "motorized rifle." With nuances and variations, all these terms refer to the same combat arm. Probably the older U. S. term "armored infantry" is still the most descriptive.

The vehicle for armored infantry has a variety of names. In U.S. parlance, it was long called an "armored personnel carrier." As the Army developed a more capable vehicle, it became "mechanized infantry combat vehicle," and finally "infantry fighting vehicle." The Germans speak of a "Schützenpanzer," which could be translated as "infantry tank." The Soviet term for their BMP series translates as "armored infantry vehicle." All these terms refer to vehicles with the same general role in combat. All of them have at least some fighting capability ranging from pintle-mounted machine guns to the mix of weapons carried today. If one accepts "armored infantry" for the men, then the Soviet term "armored infantry vehicle" is probably the most descriptive.

German Panzergrenadiere

The Germans knew even before World War II began that tanks would be ineffective without infantry support. Tanks alone could not penetrate anti-tank defenses without suffering excessive losses. Once breakthrough was achieved, tanks alone could not exploit the success by holding terrain or encircling enemy formations. Accordingly, the Germans insisted on the integration of tanks and infantry, sometimes even to company level, with a single commander in charge. The Germans referred to their armored infantry as Panzergrenadiere. The term "grenadier" suggested shock troops, derived from the grenadier company that formed the elite of an 18th century infantry regiment.

 


In the attack, the Germans generally led with tanks, closely followed by infantry that was often reinforced with assault guns. Both tanks and infantry typically advanced in bounds while covering their advance with fire. In the event of light resistance, tanks and infantry continued together across the objective. When mounted in half-tracks, the infantry behaved like the junior partner in an armored formation. If, on the other hand, the tanks encountered obstacles or strong anti­tank defenses, a much different pattern ensued. Then the Panzergrenadiere dismounted as close to the objective as possible and cleared the way for the tanks. As the infantry advanced, it had supporting fires from its own heavy weapons, organic antiaircraft, and often assault guns.

Throughout the war, the Panzergrenadiere suffered from lack of equipment. The Germans produced two basic types of half-tracked vehicles for their use. The larger vehicle, Sonderkraftfahrzeug 251, carried twelve troops and weighed 8.5 tons. At best, the Germans were able to equip only one infantry battalion in each armored division with these vehicles. By the end of the war, only a few favored divisions, such as Großdeutschland, were fully equipped. As a result, the Panzergrenadiere often had only motor transport or simply had to walk. In numerous instances, they rode the tanks, a technique also employed by their Soviet opponents.

The Germans experimented endlessly with self-propelled, direct fire weapons that supported Panzergrenadiere and normal infantry. They mounted flamethrowers, 37-mm anti-tank guns, and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns on half-tracks. They mounted short and long barreled 75-mm guns on the chassis of armored cars, half-tracks, and main battle tanks. One of their more formidable direct support weapons was a 105-mm howitzer mounted low on a main tank chassis with 50-mm armor. These weapons bridged the gap between heavy infantry weapons and tanks.

 


American Armored Infantry

The American counterpart to Panzergrenadiere, was called "armored infantry." American combined arms doctrine closely followed German practice. It was axiomatic that tanks and armored infantry complemented each other and had to fight in close coordination. Tanks were almost invulnerable to automatic weapons, yet easily wounded by mines and anti-tank guns. With infantry, just the reverse was true. Tanks could not hold terrain, or even defend themselves after they stopped moving, while infantry was eminently capable of holding its ground.

According to U. S. doctrine, the assault echelon normally contained both tanks and armored infantry so they could regroup as conditions dictated. The tanks would lead until unfavorable terrain, obstacles, or anti-tank guns made it desirable for the infantry to lead. Throughout the assault, the arms remained mutually supporting. The infantry expected the tanks to suppress enemy automatic weapons fire, while the tankers expected the infantry to neutralize the enemy's anti-tank weapons.

Armored infantry advanced in its vehicles until enemy fire or unfavorable terrain forced it to dismount. It normally fought dismounted, if possible supported by fires from its vehicles. These were dispersed and in defilade to reduce their vulnerability. In addition to vehicular weapons, armored infantry was supported by its own light machine guns, mortars, and anti-tank guns. During the attack, anti­tank guns might cover avenues of enemy armor advance, or they might support the infantry from positions near its line of departure.

One difference between German and American tactics lay in fire support. The Americans often called for indirect fire from their artillery. This fire was effective because U.S. artillery responded quickly and had tremendous stocks of ammunition. The Germans emphasized direct fire, ranging from their organic anti-tank weapons to the heaviest assault guns. Direct fire had some inherent advantages. It was more accurate and could be better coordinated with maneuver. The idea was to suppress the enemy with direct fire while tanks or infantry bounded forward. Of course, the Americans also applied direct fire, using tanks, tank destroyers, antiaircraft guns and .50 caliber machine guns mounted on the half-tracks.

 

M3 Half-Track Personnel Carrier

The M3 Half-Track was the infantry fighting vehicle of World War II. This vehicle was essentially a truck chassis with the rear axle mounted forward to drive the tracks. Armor plates were bolted onto a framework attached to the chassis. These plates were 1/4 inch except for 1/2 inch windscreens and side door shields. This armor protected against machine guns and shell fragments, however the driver's compartment and truck body had no top cover except for removable canvas. The vehicle seated three men in the driver's compartment and ten men in two rows along the sides of the truck body. Three major contractors provided the Army with almost 23,000 half-track carriers during the war. They were useful vehicles, but unfortunately they combined the least desirable features of both wheels and tracks.

The original armament for an M3 was a pintle-mounted .30 caliber machine gun, but the M3A1 had a ring-mounted .50 caliber. Six rifle scabbards were located on each side of the truck body. If necessary, the riflemen could fire over the sides of the vehicle. They dismounted either by leaping over the sides or stepping out the rear door. It is interesting to note that the U.S. Army mounted a variety of weapons on the M3 chassis. These weapons included 57-mm and 75-mm anti-tank guns, anti­aircraft guns, 81-mm mortars and even 105-mm howitzers. These were largely stop­gap systems that illustrated the need for more mobile fire support, especially in the anti-armor role.


 Developments Through the M113

U. S. Armored Personnel Carriers

Following World War II, the U. S. Army developed a series of armored personnel carriers that had limited fighting ability, culminating in the M113. The first of these was the M44, a vehicle on a medium tank chassis with overhead armor. Two soldiers sat in the driving compartment and twenty-four in the large carrying space. They could observe the flanks through two ports cut in each side wall. The vehicle had a ball-mounted .30 caliber forward, another .30 caliber that could be fired from support brackets on the corners, and a .50 caliber machine gun mounted in a rear cupola. The M44 proved unwieldy and was not produced in significant numbers.

In 1951, the Army deployed the M75, its first significant postwar armored personnel carrier. It was full-tracked and completely enclosed, affording room for two soldiers in the driver's compartment and a ten man squad in the rear. There were no vision or firing ports. The squad exited the vehicle by two rear doors or hatches in the roof. The track commander had a cupola with vision blocks and a pintle-mounted .50 caliber machine gun. The vehicle was ten feet tall, weighed about 41,500 pounds combat loaded, and was not amphibious. When deployed in Korea, the M75 saw little service as an armored personnel carrier. It was used instead as a cargo vehicle and ambulance.

In 1953, the Army standardized the M59 Full-Tracked Personnel Carrier. It carried the same two plus ten infantry, but now the squad exited over a hydraulically powered rear ramp. The first version of this vehicle retained a pintle­mounted .50 caliber, but the M59A1 had the machine gun on the cupola with a periscope for aiming. This configuration was a half-way house between pintle mount and a full turret. The M59 was slightly wider than the M75, but considerably lower at 7 feet 10 inches. To provide anti-tank capability, the M59 sometimes carried a 106-mm recoilless rifle. The Army standardized one variant, the M84 which fired a 4.2 inch mortar through a large roof hatch. The M59 was fully amphibiousdespite a combat weight of 42,600 pounds.

During 1956, the Army's Tank and Automotive Command began development of the vehicle that was standardized in 1960 as the M113 Full-Tracked Armored Personnel Carrier. The Army's goal was a light vehicle that would be amphibious, air-dropable, and easily modified for various applications. Due in large part to aluminum armor, the basic vehicle weighed only 22,600 pounds combat loaded, while still carrying two plus ten infantrymen. Like the M59, it had a hydraulically operated rear ramp but no vision ports for the infantry squad. In one respect, the M113 was less capable than its predecessor: its .50 caliber machine gun was only pintle-mounted.

The M113 became one of the world's most widely distributed and often modified armored vehicles. Through 1980, FMC built just over 63,000 units, while OTO Melara built another 4,000 under license. Some fifty countries eventually used some variant of the vehicle. Among the many variants used by the U. S. Army were a command post vehicle, mortar carrier, self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, fire support vehicle, and TOW missile carrier. It is interesting to note that several countries fitted armored turrets to the M113. Norway and Switzerland, for example, fitted a Swedish turret mounting a 20-mm cannon.

Although a success in other respects, the M113 met a cool reception from key NATO allies. When the Americans displayed the vehicle in 1960, the West Germans and French indicated that they preferred a vehicle with firing ports and heavier armor. In 1963, the West German Minister of Defense informed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that the German Army found the M113 did not meet its requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle that could stay up with tanks. In the same year, the U.S. Amy Combat Developments Command reached a similar conclusion. It found that the M113 would be incompatible with the new main battle tank for two reasons: its armor was inadequate and it provided too little firepower while the troops were mounted.

 

European Postwar Vehicles

The West Germans were not interested in the M113 because they had a different conception of infantry fighting vehicles. No sooner was the Bundeswehr created than the Germans began to develop vehicles to support Panzergrenadiere tactics. They thought these tactics required more fire power and better protection than the M113 offered. Their first important postwar vehicle was the Schützenpanzer 12-3. This was a full-tracked vehicle that accepted a crew of three plus six infantrymen. The crew included driver, gunner in a turret fitted with a 20­mm cannon, and a commander, who had his own small hatch and a pintle-mounted 7.62-mm machine gun. The SPZ 12-3 conception, i.e. a well-armed vehicle dismounting an infantry fire team, foreshadowed development in both the Soviet and American armies. By the early 1960's, the Germans had already received prototypes of the Marder, a larger and more capable vehicle than the SPZ 12-3 of similar conception.

The French also developed infantry combat vehicles with greater combat power than the American M113. However, in contrast to the German example, hey hesitated to accept a diminution in dismounted infantry strength. In 1957, the French began production of the AMX Véhicule de Combat d'lnfantrie (VCI). This was a full-tracked vehicle on light tank chassis that accomodated a crew of two plus ten infantrymen. It originally had a pintle-mounted 7.5-mm machine gun, but later a turret-mounted 7.62-mm. By the mid-1960's, the French were developing the AMX-10P which would carry a crew of three and eight infantrymen, while mounting a 25-mm cannon and coaxial machine gun.

The first postwar Soviet vehicle was the BTR-152, essentially an armored truck comparable to the World War II half-tracks. In 1961, the Soviets publically displayed the BTR-60P, a wheeled vehicle with an open top, which carried a crew of two plus twelve infantry. It had a pintle-mounted machine gun. A notable aspect of the BTR-60P was the three firing ports and two small doors on each side of the hull, showing a strong interest in mounted infantry combat. The BTR-60PA had overhead armor, while the BTR-60PB added a turret for the machine gun. Normal manning for this variant was two plus eight infantry, although as many as fourteen infantry could fit. As with their tanks, the Soviets showed little compunction about cramming men into very small spaces. During the early 1960's, the Soviets were developing their Boevaya Mashina Pekhota (BMP-1), which would alarm the West when it appeared publically in 1967.

 

The U. S. Mechanized Infantry Fighting Vehicle (MICV)

XM701: A False Start

During the early 1960's, the U. S. Army Combat Developments Command staffed a qualitative materiel requirement for another infantry fighting vehicle. At this time, the Infantry Center was strongly divided on the issue. Some felt that the infantry could no longer expect to fight dismounted quite as it had in the past, because the battlefield, especially the nuclear battlefield, had become too deadly. In addition, they thought that infantry needed heavier supporting fires such as a better fighting vehicle could provide. Others believed strongly that infantry should maintain its traditional emphasis on dismounted combat. They pointed out that mounted infantry developed little combat power. They feared that a new infantry combat vehicle could engender a false sense of security and become a coffin for the troops it carried.

According to a generally held assumption at the time, war in Europe would quickly escalate to nuclear exchanges. An exchange would probably kill most of the enemy infantry in the objective area. Moreover, friendly infantry might have to remain in its vehicles for extended periods to avoid radiation hazards. In such a situation, it would have to conduct a completely mechanized assault, riding over the objective while firing from within its vehicles on such targets as remained. This picture of mechanized combat on a nuclear battlefield dictated the requirement that the new vehicle offer shelter for a continuous twenty-four hours.

In March 1964, Combat Developments Command requested approval from Department of the Army for the new requirement. It called for mobility equivalent to a tank, the capacity to carry twelve men, a 20-mm cannon mounted in a turret stabilized to permit fire on the move, and firing ports for individual weapons. Portions of the armor were to be proof against 23-mm fire, since the Soviets were thought to be developing a new 23-mm cannon. Pacific Car and Foundry received a contract to build prototypes of this vehicle, designated Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV) '65 and later XM701.

The prototypes were delivered in early 1965 and proved to be a disappointment. XM701 mounted an Hispano Suiza 20-mm cannon in an unstabilized, two-man turret. There were ball mount firing ports for the ten infantrymen firing their M14 rifles. In consideration of the radiological, chemical, and biological threats, the vehicle had an overpressure system. To allow occupancy for twenty-four hours, it also had a stove and a toilet. It weighed 54,050 pounds in steel fabrication and 50,750 pounds in aluminum. After field testing, the Army rejected XM701 as too large, slow, and heavy.

 

Debate Over the Requirement

During 1966 and 1967, while the Vietnam War was in progress, Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory conducted two studies under Army contract. In June 1966, Cornell completed the first study, a parametric design and cost effectiveness analysis for a vehicle designated MICV-70. This study concluded that MICV-70 should be full-tracked with aluminum armor and a turret, not merely a pedestal mount. It should have a stabilized cannon in preference to a heavy machine gun and accommodate twelve men. In June 1967, Cornell completed a second study considering whether TOW should be mounted in place of the proposed cannon. This study concluded that some TOW MICV would be helpful in repelling an armor attack, but would be less useful against enemy infantry. A few months after this study was published, the Soviet BMP-1 made its public debut on Red Square in Moscow.

The BMP-1, first known in the West as M-1967 or BMP-76PB, offered more combat power than the earlier BTR-60. It accommodated a crew of three (commander, driver, and gunner), plus eight infantrymen. There were four firing ports on each side of the hull. Normally, the first port on each side was intended for a 7.62-mm machine gun and the remaining ports for automatic rifles. The one-man turret mounted a 73-mm smoothbore gun, a coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun, and an AT-3 Sagger missile. In addition, the infantrymen carried an RPG-7 anti-tank weapon and an SA-7 Grail anti-aircraft weapon. The vehicle had an overpressure system and was fully amphibious. A reconnaissance model had a two-man turret. Despite these impressive capabilities, the BMP-1 was only about six feet high and ten feet wide. It sharpened the terms of debate by giving precise definition to one element of the threat.

 


The MICV program began officially in January 1968, while the Army was heavily engaged in Vietnam. From the beginning, the program was controversial. Combat Developments Command favored an "arms room" concept that would delete two members of the ten man squad and substitute a weapons mix of light machine guns, light anti-tank weapons, grenade launchers, mortars, and flame throwers. Continental Army Command rejected this "arms room" concept and considered the proposed vehicle too large and complex. The Vice Chief of Staff General Ralph E. Haines, Jr. concurred with Continental Army Command. He disapproved the qualitative materiel requirement proposed by Combat Developments Command and proposed instead development of a MICV that would serve primarily as transportation, rather than as a weapons platform. In August, the Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland directed formation of a MICV Ad Hoc Study Group to be led by Colonel George W. Casey, then Deputy Director of Doctrine in the Combat Developments Command. Casey had thirty days to complete his study.

Colonel Casey came to his assignment with strong opinions on the role of mechanized infantry, as armored infantry was then called. In the mid-1960's, he had commanded a mechanized battalion and then a mechanized brigade in Europe. During these assignments, he became aware that U.S. tactics were founded on the "2 1/2 mile per hour infantryman" In other words, infantry officers thought too exclusively of the dismounted role. Armored personnel carriers were used simply as transportation to the line of departure. By contrast, Casey thought that mechanized infantry should exploit its light armored vehicles to operate more closely with tanks. To accomplish this change, he envisioned a successor to the M113 which would have better armor protection, firing ports, and a more lethal main weapon, perhaps a rapid-firing cannon.

On 12 September 1968, Colonel Casey submitted the final report of his Ad Hoc Study Group. He recommended development of one vehicle with infantry, cavalry, and combat support variants. The infantry variant should accomodate a three man crew (driver, gunner and commander) plus nine infantrymen. There should be six firing port weapons, probably M-16s with folding stocks. The vehicle should have a two-man turret mounting a stabilized, rapid fire cannon and a 7.62-mm machine gun. This armament would allow American infantry to fight successfully against Soviet motorized rifle troops equipped with the BMP. In fact, a rapid-fire cannon would be more effective against light armor than the Soviet 73-mm gun with its low muzzle velocity. Vehicle weight should not exceed 40,000 pounds. These recommendations confirmed the requirement proposed by Combat Developments Command. Casey would probably have contributed to the development of this vehicle, but he was killed in 1970 as a major general commanding the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam.

In October, General Westmoreland approved a qualitative materiel requirement for the MICV, based upon the Casey Report. Two months later, Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory completed a follow-on study largely confirming Casey's analysis, but recommending a heavier vehicle. Cornell estimated the cost at $134,000. This amount seemed high during the Vietnam War and the austere period that followed. In 1970, Congress refused to fund the MICV program, criticizing the vehicle as too costly, heavy and complex. At this point, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Lt. Gen. Arthur S. Collins, Jr. revised the MICV concept to reduce its cost. Among other changes, he made the turret just large enough for the gunner, placing the commander in the hull. For several reasons, this one-man turret later proved unsound. However, the reduced cost prompted a favorable decision for prototyping (Milestone I). In 1972, the Army awarded FMC a $29.3 million contract to build seventeen prototypes of a MICV (XM723). This vehicle was to carry an eleven man squad, have a one-man turret, and weigh 43,000 pounds. It was to be transportable by air and amphibious.


 

The Product Improved M113A1 (XM765)

During the MICV debate, FMC developed the XM765 under Army contract. With refinements, this vehicle appeared in 1970 as the Product Improved M113A1. Although the Army rejected the Product Improved M113A1 due to inadequate mobility and protection, FMC continued it as a private venture under the name Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Netherlands placed an initial order in 1975 and Belgium made a license agreement in 1979. This vehicle illustrated evolution of the familiar M113 to provide fighting power at the level required in Europe after the appearance of BMP-1 and Marder.

The Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle carried a crew of three plus seven infantrymen. The gunner sat in a one-man turret, while the commander sat in the hull behind the driver, a layout similar to the MICV that was approved for prototyping in 1972. The main armament was an Oerlikon 25-mm cannon with coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun. The vehicle had two firing ports on each side of the hull and one in the rear ramp. Laminate steel armor was fitted on the sides of the hull and the turret front. Combat loaded, the vehicle weighed only 27,000 pounds. FMC developed kits to convert this vehicle into a command vehicle, mortar carrier, TOW vehicle, ambulance, or recovery vehicle.


Emergence of the Bradley

Western European Developments

In the early 1970's, the Western Europeans fielded several infantry combat vehicles which were far more capable than the M113 still in service with the U.S. Army. The most important was the Marder, initially deployed by the Germans in 1971. The Marder carried a crew of three plus seven infantrymen. The infantrymen had two firing ports on each side of the hull and two circular hatches on each side of the roof, giving them several ways to fire while mounted. A 20-mm Rheinmetall cannon with a coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun was mounted externally on top of the turret. On the rear portion of the roof was a remote controlled 7.62-mm machine gun. The vehicle was well-armored and extremely heavy at 62,000 pounds. It could ford to a depth of about five feet without preparation, or to eight feet with a snorkel fitted.

German doctrine for employment of Marder resembled Panzergrenadiere tactics in World War II, envisioning close cooperation of armor and infantry. Indeed, the Germans grouped these two branches together as Kampftruppen (Combat Troops). In normal practice, they cross-attached one Panzergrenadiere company to each tank battalion, and conversely one tank company to each Panzergrenadiere battalion. The Germans expected their infantry to fight both mounted and dismounted during most actions. As a rule, the infantry fought mounted as long as enemy and terrain permitted. Marder-equipped infantry was too vulnerable to participate in tank versus tank battles on open terrain, but its value increased when the enemy employed anti-tank weapons or terrain became more difficult. When fighting dismounted, the infantry did not venture outside the range of the Marder's weapons, otherwise an important advantage would be lost. During defensive engagements, the Marder opened fire at the extreme range of its armament, while the dismounted infantry took positions on reverse slopes. As, during World War II, German doctrine continued in the 1970's to influence U.S. thought on employment of infantry combat vehicles.

In 1973, the French fielded AMX-10P as a replacement for AMX VCI. This vehicle had a three man crew plus eight infantrymen. Gunner and commander rode in a two-man turret, mounting a 20-mm cannon and coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun.

The vehicle had an aluminum hull and only half the weight of the Marder. It was fully amphibious and propelled by waterjets.

The October War had a strong influence on thinking at the U. S. Army Training  and Doctrine Command. During this war, both sides lost large numbers of armored vehicles to the combined fires of aviation, tanks, anti-tank guns, and anti-tank guided missiles. In counterattacks against Egyptian positions, the Israeli tankers suffered appalling losses until adequately supported by their own infantry and artillery. The October War drove home an old lesson of World War II: tanks cannot operate successfully without close support from other arms. It led to American reemphasis on the German Army's Panzergrenadiere doctrine. The 1973 war also showed that armored infantry could not adequately support the tanks, unless equipped with well-protected vehicles. The Israelis developed the Merkava main battle tank with a rear compartment that could accomodate six infantrymen.

 

Reconfiguration of MICV

For several reasons, the U.S. Army reconfigured the MICV in 1976, restoring a two-man turret while reducing the infantry strength. The first reason concerned the cancellation of the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle program. It was intended to develop a light four-man vehicle that would be suitable for armored cavalry. When the prototype was ready in 1973, this program had converged in many respects with the MICV. The office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operational Research) challenged the Army's need for two vehicles with such similar characteristics. About the same time, General William E. DePuy, at the head of Training and Doctrine Command, saw the prototype and was amazed by its resemblance to the MS Stuart light tank of World War II. He recalled that light tanks had been among the least effective armored vehicles of that war. Maj. Gen. Donn A. Starry, commanding the Armor Center, had a similar reaction.      

When the Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., visited Fort Monroe, DePuy showed him a picture of a light tank battalion in World War II and then a picture of the prototype scout vehicle. Abrams could hardly see a difference and agreed with DePuy that the Army did not need to resurrect the World War II light tank. DePuy terminated the scout vehicle program by withdrawing the requirement. The ill-fated scout had a two-man turret, a necessary feature for its  role. When the scout vehicle was encorporated into the MICV program, it became expedient to provide both variants with a two-man turret.

The second reason concerned addition of the recently fielded TOW anti-tank guided missile. Soviet anti-tank guided missiles had performed poorly in the 1973 war, but the U.S. Army expected much better results from TOW. Computer simulations played an U.S. battalion task force against a Soviet reinforced tank or motorized rifle regiment. The Soviet regiment had so many armored vehicles that it overran the Americans, unless they employed large numbers of anti-armor weapons, principally TOW. But within the existing force structure, only the MICV offered itself as a suitable platform. When the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council met on 6 March 1975 to consider a decision for full engineering development (Milestone II), opinion was divided. Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense strongly advocated mounting TOW on the MICV. The Army Staff, supported by Training and Doctrine Command, argued that an infantry combat vehicle should not be distracted by an anti-armor role. But the  Decision Memorandum of 24 April directed the Army to consider how TOW might be combined with an automaticcannon.

General DePuy was not eager to add TOW to the MICV. He thought that TOW's range advantage would seldom be realized in Europe, where terrain and weather restrict visibility. He doubted that gunners could obtain under battlefield conditions the probable kill assumed in the simulations. He saw that TOW would delay the MICV program and increase its cost. DePuy and Starry also realized that TOW could conflict with the normal mission of armored infantry. TOW was best sited on high ground with large fields of fire, but the infantry mission demanded that the MICV operate in broken terrain and built-up areas in support of its dismounted infantry. However, DePuy realized that the Army needed more anti- armor weapons and could not obtain approval for MICV without TOW. Adding TOW pointed strongly towards a two-man turret.

The third reason was the results of operational testing with prototype vehicles using soldier crews. The results showed that a one-man turret was undesirable even for an infantry combat vehicle without added armament. From his position within the hull, the squad leader could see little to his right (due to the turret) or rear. At the same time, the gunner was overwhelmed with the needs to simultaneously survey terrain, engage targets, and communicate with the squad leader. As a result, the Infantry Center favored return to a two-man turret.

In spring 1976, the Army Staff still proposed TOW as an option on a one-man turret. However, in summer, Secretary of the Army Martin Hoffmann challenged the MICV concept and directed a program review. To assure impartiality, the Army selected Brig. Gen. Richard X. Larkin, an officer with no previous exposure to the MICV program. Larkin was an infantry officer with previous assignments in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the office of the Secretary of the Army. At the time, he was assistant division commander of 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson. Larkin assembled an analytic team at Fort Benning, where the prototype vehicle was available. The Infantry Center assisted Larkin, but did not attempt to assert its own views. Larkin quickly concluded that the Army should put TOW on every possible vehicle, if the missile would not restrict other missions. Even then, he wondered if the Army could stop the onslaught of Warsaw Pact armor.

Larkin saw the conflict between the anti-armor role and the infantry support role so he recommended retention of the Improved TOW Vehicle, an M113 fitted with an elevating TOW launcher. The company or battalion commander would place the Improved TOW Vehicle on the best approaches for tanks, relieving MICV of this responsibility. To further maintain the integrity of the MICV's role, its automatic cannon should be regarded as the primary armament. Implicit in this analysis was the understanding that no squad or platoon leader would abandon his dismounted soldiers in order to pursue enemy armor.

Larkin found that several conflicting requirements influenced the size of the vehicle. MICV had to be small enough to fit into a C-141 aircraft and to be reasonably inconspicuous on the battlefield. But it had to be large enough to carry spaced laminate armor and accommodate 95th percentile soldiers (6' and 200 lbs). Larkin and the Program Manager Col. Stan R. Sheridan both felt that the vehicle profile was too high, especially when compared with the Soviet BMP, but could not find an acceptable way to lower the profile. Ground clearance, floor armor to defeat mines, and room for a seated soldier dictated the height of the hull, while the turret had to accommodate two men and the installation of two major weapons systems.

During the course of his study, General Larkin became concerned that the MICV might be too vulnerable, but he could not add armor without giving up a swim capability that was already marginal. The vehicle was inherently nose-heavy and FMC had not experimented with spaced panels or external appendages that would make it float. To underscore his doubt about swim capability, Larkin enlivened his briefing with a picture of MICV crossing a water obstacle slung beneath a helicopter. In retrospect, he thought that either the Army should have dropped the swim requirement or had FMC redesign the vehicle. Colonel Sheridan thought that the requirement should be dropped because the swim barrier was so unwieldy.

Even without additional armor, Larkin decided that the MICV could survive through its own mobility and armament, plus the combat power of the accompanying main battle tanks. In his briefing, Larkin suggested one other possibility:

A requirement to up-armor at least a segment of the MICV fleet - that segment which has to keep very close company with the XM1 - may be met by a 46-50 ton vehicle, developed from XM1 component technology, with roughly comparable mobility and performance capability.

In other words, Larkin suggested a heavy infantry fighting vehicle based on a main battle tank chassis. Whatever its merits, such a project was illusionary at the time, given the reactions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to the smaller MICV.

On 5 October 1976, Larkin delivered a decision briefing to the Army Staff incorporating the results of his study. He recommended development of two MICV variants: an infantry fighting vehicle and a scout vehicle. TOW should be added, but would not fit in the current one-man turret. Larkin outlined the advantages of a two-man turret: accommodation of TOW, improved control by the squad leader, more ammunition storage, room for future weapon systems, and less danger of overloading the soldiers with simultaneous tasks. The disadvantages were increased cost, more weight, and probable restriction of squad size to only nine men (crew of three plus six infantrymen). He recommended fielding MICV in 1980 with a two-man turret, adding TOW either during production or in the field.

On 3 November 1976, Secretary Hoffmann approved the major recommendations of the Larkin Report. There was to be one vehicle for infantry and armored cavalry use with a two-man turret, an armored TOW launcher, and a 25-mm cannon. With this decision, the MICV finally evolved into the configuration that would be standardized as the M2/3 Bradley. On the following day, the Army signed a sole source contract with FMC for development of the vehicle.

 


Additional Studies

In January 1977, the Army informed Congress of Secretary Hoffmann's decision. The Senate Armed Services Committee criticized the concept, doubting that the proposed vehicle could survive well enough to be a partner to the XM1 tank. During a budget review in early 1978, the Office of the Secretary of Defense deleted funding for the program, now called Infantry Fighting Vehicle/Cavalry Fighting Vehicle. After the Army requested reconsideration, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued new guidance on 21 February 1978. The Army was to maintain options for fiscal year 1980 procurement while evaluating alternatives.

In response to a congressional directive, Maj. Gen. Pat W. Crizer headed a  study group to review the program and consider more survivable alternatives. In April 1978, he published the results of his Infantry Fighting Vehicle Task Force. Crizer considered a variety of U.S.-made and foreign vehicles. He rejected the Marder for these reasons: cannon not stabilized, no thermal night sight, MILAN anti-tank missile not under armor, no swim capability, not C141 transportable, and excessive cost at $500,000. He rejected the BMP for these reasons: limited range of its 73-mm gun, no stabilization, no thermal night sight, one-man turret, too little ground clearance, and lack of space to accomodate the 95th percentile soldier (six  feet tall, 200 pounds).           

Crizer also considered two conceptual alternatives using XM1 components and armored to XM1 standard: a vehicle mounting the 25-mm cannon and TOW; and a vehicle mounting a larger gun then under development. He estimated that the first alternative would cost $889,000 and the second $1,012,000, in contrast to the

Infantry Fighting Vehicle, which was expected to cost only $370,000. Not surprisingly, he concluded that the two heavier alternative vehicles were not cost effective. General Starry, now in charge of Training and Doctrine Command, was disappointed by the Crizer Report. Starry thought that if tanks and armored infantry were to operate on the same axis, the infantry needed a heavier fighting vehicle. In his opinion, Crizer had provided too much volume in the conceptual alternatives, thus inflating their size and cost. However, Starry realized that the time was hardly propitious to surface a proposal for a heavy infantry combat vehicle, howeversound analytically.

The Crizer Report concluded that the Infantry Fighting Vehicle with its two­man turret met the infantry's needs and had no major design flaws. However, Crizer emphasized that the primary purpose of the vehicle was to"facilitate the dismounted employment of infantrymen." Firepower was a secondary consideration. As a result, he recommended that the interior be redesigned to accept two more infantrymen, if possible.

At Fort Leavenworth, Brig. Gen. Fred K. Mahaffey, Assistant Deputy Commander of the Combined Combat Arms Development Activity, led another study group, whose results were published in August 1978. Mahaffey did calculations of squad size. He estimated that an eleven man squad could perform the mechanized infantry tasks and implement an infantry obstacle plan, while a nine man squad could implement only a portion of the plan. As a result, he recommended an eleven man squad, as Crizer had. Mahaffey found that if TOW were removed from the Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the remaining anti-tank weapons were insufficient. He also found that deploying a larger number of Improved TOW Vehicles was not cost effective.

In 1980, funding was restored to the Infantry Fighting Vehicle program. The  following year, the Army received its first production models and named the new vehicle after General Omar M. Bradley. At about the same time, the Soviets were  fielding a comparable vehicle. During the November 1982 parade in Moscow, they displayed their BMP-2, a vehicle configured much like the Bradley. The BMP-2 mounted an AT-5 Spandrel anti-tank missile and a 30-mm cannon with coaxial 7.62­mm machine gun in a two-man turret. It carried a crew of three plus six infantrymen in the rear compartment.

 

Squad Size in the Bradley

The size of a Bradley squad remained controversial within the Army. The crucial issue was dismounted infantry strength. The original MICV with one-man turret had a crew of three plus nine infantrymen. When the squad leader chose to dismount, there would be a full squad often men on the ground, who could deploy as two fire teams. The Infantry Fighting Vehicle with two-man turret had a crew of three plus six infantrymen, two next to the turret and four in the rear compartment. During most operations, the driver and gunner would have to remain with the vehicle. The squad leader could remain with the vehicle or go with his infantrymen when they dismounted. He would probably choose to be with the element, whether vehicle or infantry, which was maneuvering at the time. The total dismounted strength was thus only seven men, a strong fire team. The vehicle itself became the second fire team.

An additional one or even two men could fit into the rear compartment. However, they would be cramped and there would be little room for additional hand-held weapons or munitions. In 1982, at the insistence of the Infantry Center,”] the Army added one man, restoring the ten man squad and bringing the dismounted strength to eight. However, the tenth man was cut again the following year as Army reduced all its infantry squads to nine men, a decision conditioned by the authorized end strength of the Army.

 

Doctrine for the M2 Bradley

The Continuing Influence of World War II

The Bradley was designed to implement the doctrine that armored infantry tried to implement in World War II, although lacking a fully capable vehicle. This war strongly affected Bradley tactics, indirectly through the West German Panzergrenadiere and directly through American officers who had fought in the war. General DePuy and General Starry, successive leaders of the Training and Doctrine Command, were impressed with German Panzergrenadiere tactics. In addition, DePuy had experience fighting Germans in the European theater. He was one of the last officers from World War II to influence development of the Bradley and doctrine for its employment.

 

During World War II, DePuy acquired respect for German combined arms and suppression. He was impressed by the German use of suppressive fire. Before the Germans maneuvered, they would lay down fire, forcing the Americans to take cover and disrupting their response. The more Germans fired, the less Americans returned fire, until finally the Germans came within hand grenade range or penetrated the American positions. When DePuy encountered German positions, he usually found a mixture of infantry and tracked vehicles, assault guns or tanks. The defense was integrated but not fixed. He could hear the German non­commissioned officers shouting orders to their men and he realized that they were assuming new positions, making the tactical problem more difficult.

During World War II, DePuy learned to use suppressive fire while maneuvering. He was awed by immense firepower of 4th Armored Division: .50 calibers on M3 half-tracks, .30 calibers mounted coaxially with their tank guns, and also the 76-mm main gun. He watched 4th Armored Division employ "reconnaissance by fire," actually a form of suppression, blistering the areas where enemy might be deployed, such as a woodline or the edge of a village. He developed a similar tactic for his own infantry battalion by consolidating machine guns into a base of fire. He used tank destroyers in the same role. The tank destroyers assumed an overwatch position, ready to lay down heavy direct fires in support of the infantry maneuvering under their guns. After the war, DePuy applied similar tactics to mechanized infantry. He saw that a mechanized infantry squad could be very small, because it enjoyed the suppressive fires of an armored task force.

Doctrine for the Bradley closely followed General DePuy's wartime experience. Typically, one element of an armored task force would maneuver, while the other element assumed an overwatch position, ready to deliver suppressive fires. In fairly open country, the tanks might lead, while Bradleys assumed an overwatch position, preferably in hull defilade. As the tanks advanced, the Bradleys would suppress anti-tank weapons through cannon and machine gun fire. In more difficult terrain, dismounted infantry might lead the way, while supported by fires from tanks and Bradleys. Typically, the infantry would bound forward, protected during each bound by suppressive fire, until it closed with the enemy. Enemy resistance, either anticipated or suddenly encountered, would affect tactics. An armored task force might overrun light resistance, dismounting the infantry only to mop-up. At the other extreme, a well-prepared anti-tank defense might compel the infantry to dismount well short of the objective.

The Problem of Vulnerability

Despite its advanced armor, the Bradley was considerably more vulnerable than its partner, the M1 tank. Like the tank, but to a greater degree, the Bradley faced a dilemma: it was at the same time a deadly and fragile machine. Brig. Gen. Stan R. Sheridan, the project manager when MICV was reconfigured, and Brig. Gen. Richard X. Larkin, whose study led to the reconfiguration, were both concerned that the vehicle might be too vulnerable for its mission. Larkin decided that the Bradley had enough mobility and firepower to survive, if well handled by its crew. In addition, he saw that the support of friendly tanks in combined arms teams would help. Sheridan, on the basis of the Mahaffey and Crizer studies, thought that armor protection up to main battle tank standard would result in prohibitive cost and weight. He was willing to trade armor for mobility. He did not think of the Bradley as running side-by-side with tanks, although he later found the phrase in one of his own briefings. Instead, he envisioned the Bradley in overwatch position, or on the flanks of advancing tanks.

Bradley doctrine sought to minimize the vehicle's vulnerability. When tanks and Bradleys advanced on the same axis, tanks might lead or dismounted infantry might lead, but seldom Bradleys with their infantry mounted. If tanks led, Bradleys would usually follow at an interval of 200-400 meters or closer. If dismounted infantry led, Bradleys and tanks would support by fire. Bradleys would occupy hull­down positions whenever possible. In such positions, only the turret would be exposed to enemy fire. For greater protection, the Bradley might occupy a turret­ down position. To initiate an engagement, the driver would edge forward until the gunner indicated that he had fields of fire.

The problem of vulnerability might be solved by up-armoring the Bradley or eventually fielding a heavier vehicle. General DePuy and General Starry thought that an infantry fighting vehicle, which was intended to work with tanks, should  logically be a comparable vehicle. They envisioned a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, probably on a main battle tank chassis, fitted with a small cannon and perhaps an anti-tank guided missile. General DePuy recalled an historic example of such a vehicle: the Kangaroo personnel carrier used by Canadian armored units in Europe during World War II. This vehicle was based on an M4 Sherman tank hull without turret. One version had a roof with a small cupola in the turret ring, while another version was left open.

 

Conclusion

Doctrine for armored infantry has changed little in its essentials since World War II. The 1944 Field Manual for the armored infantry company reads:

4. EMPLOYMENT, a. The armored infantry rifle company normally fights dismounted. Under favorable conditions vehicular armament either mounted or dismounted is used to support. If vehicles are used, they must be placed in defilade and dispersed. The company moves forward in vehicles until forced by enemy fire, or unfavorable terrain, to dismount.

117. SUPPORTING WEAPONS, a. The mortar and machine guns are supporting weapons. The vehicular weapons are used to support the advance whenever terrain and enemy action permit. [Accompanying Figure 24 shows half­tracked vehicles delivering suppressive fire from an overwatch position.]

 

This 1944 doctrine resembles that for the М2 Bradley in 1987, except that the Bradley permits a higher incidence of mounted combat than was possible with the М3 Half-Track. Even this difference is less than might appear at first glance. Although incomparably superior to its predecessors, the Bradley must also operate on a far more lethal battlefield.

All the U.S. armored infantry vehicles had some fighting capability; none were designed to be just carriers. However, by the 1970's, the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier was so overtaken by the threat that practically speaking only the carrying function remained. If developmental vehicles are considered, the М2 Bradley becomes the last in an unbroken evolutionary sequence. The Bradley seemed revolutionary from an American perspective because it was compared directly with the M113. From a European perspective, the U.S. Army had fallen a decade behind by the late 1970's and needed a new vehicle to keep pace.

 

The Bradley represents a compromise among the competing demands for mobility, armor protection, firepower, and dismounted infantry strength. The first three elements are present in a main battle tank. By adding the fourth, an infantry fighting vehicle raises even more difficult problems for design and tactical employment. The arguments that American officers have made for and against lightly armored infantry fighting vehicles with greatly increased firepower may be summarized as follows. These arguments are from a clean start; they do not imply that American officers reject a program already in progress, such as the Bradley.

 

Pro infantry fighting vehicle: To operate in an armored task force, the infantry requires a vehicle with enough protection to survive artillery bursts and machine gun fire until it dismounts. In addition, the task force must support its maneuver with more suppressive fire than the tanks alone can provide. Historically, machine guns on the infantry vehicles plus various self- propelled weapons have provided these fires. Currently, the infantry fighting vehicle has enough firepower to render additional fire support vehicles superfluous. This firepower makes the vehicle more useful and also more survivable against the opposing anti-armor weapons. With the infantry fighting vehicle, troops will have to dismount less often, thus adding to the tempo and shock effect of the armored task force. The infantry fighting vehicle is too vulnerable to use the same assault tactics as tanks. But it can survive and support both the tanks and dismounted infantry by taking overwatch positions in defilade, or by other tactic as the situation demands.

 

Contra infantry fighting vehicle: There is an unquestioned need for some vehicle to carry the infantry in an armored task force. But the attempt to mount too much firepower detracts from the original purpose. Infantry complements the tanks because it is not vulnerable to anti-tank weapons. But an infantry fighting vehicle is even more vulnerable to these weapons because it is more lightly armored. As a fighting vehicle, it approximates the light tank, which gave disappointing results in World War II. As an infantry carrier, it can dismount only a strong fire team, unless the vehicle becomes unreasonably large and heavy. Battlefield losses will quickly reduce the fire team's strength until it becomes incapable of performing its mission. The infantry fighting vehicle is an uncomfortable compromise between light tank and infantry carrier, performing neither function optimally. If additional firepower is needed, it should be provided by specialized vehicles without detracting from the dismounted infantry strength.

 

 

A Note on Sources

 

Interviews Conducted by the Center of Military History:

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Howard H. Cooksey, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, at his home in Alexandria, Virginia, on 12 May 1987.

Gen. (ret.) William E. DePuy, former commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, at the National Defense University, Fort NcNair, Washington, D.C. on 15 May 1987.

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Richard X.. Larkin, chairman of Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle Task Force in 1976, at the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, McLean, Virginia, on 22 May 1987.

Mr. Richard S. Miller, analyst, Land Forces, Program Evaluation and Analysis, Offce of the Secretary of Defense, at his office in the Pentagon on 13 May 1987.

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Stan R. Sheridan, Project Manager, Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, from 1975 to 1978, at his home inAlexandria, Virginia, on 11 May 1987.

Gen. (ret.) Donn A. Strarry, former commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, at his office. Ford Aerospace, Alexandria, Virginia, on 18 May 1987.

Dr. Richard J. Trainor, former Director of Systems Review and Analysis, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition, at his office, Trainor Associates, Rosslyn, Virginia, on 22 May 1987.

 

Unpublished Documents (in chronological order)

"Can the Armored Personnel Carrier Be Justified?" The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, authors: Lt. Col. Jack R. Metzdorf, Maj. James R. Waldie, et alii, May 1952, originally classified SECRET, declassified in 1964.

"Mechanized Infantry Battalion Without Attachments," presentation by Lt. Col. George W. Casey, V Corps Seminar, 9 February 1965.

"Parametric Design / Cost Effectiveness Study for a Mechanized Infantry Combat

Vehicle - 1970," Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Buffalo, New York, 1966.

"Decision Briefing," Brig. Gen. Richard X. Larkin, Chairman, Mechanized Infantry

Combat Vehicle Task Force, 5 October 1976, classified CONFIDENTIAL.

"Report of the Special Study Group on the Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the Cavalry

Fighting Vehicle (U)," U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Agency, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, authors: Dr. Wilbur B. Payne,

Col. Reed E. Davis, Jr., Lt. Col. J. Lynn Fleming, 28 July 1978, classified SECRET.

"Study Results, Infantry Fighting Vehicle Task Force (U)," signed by Maj. Gen. Pat W. Crizer [Crizer Report], April 1978, classified SECRET.

"Infantry Fighting Vehicle and Cavalry Fighting Vehicle Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (U), Volume II, Main Report," Special Study Group, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, authors: Maj. William A. Brinkley, Maj. John H. Shuford, 15 October 1978, classified CONFIDENTIAL.

"Report of the Special Study Group on the Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (U), Volume IV," Combined Arms Development Activity, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, prepared under direction of Brig. Gen. Fred K. Mahaffey [Mahaffey Report], 28 August 1978, classified CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN.

"Infantry Fighting Vehicle I Cavalry Fighting Vehicle Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis Update (U), Volume 6, Supporting Analyses," Director of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, authors: Cpt. J. M. Allen, Cpt. R. Gilbert, Cpt. M. Griffith et alii, April 1980, classified CONFIDENTIAL. ....

"Organizations, Technology, and Weapons Acquisition: The Development of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle," doctoral dissertation, Daniel J. Kaufman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1983.

 

U. S. Army Doctrinal Publications (Selective List)

Field Manual (FM) 17-40, Armored Infantry Company, War Department, U.S.

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1944.        i

FM 17-36, Armored Employment of Tanks with Infantry, \Nar Department, U.S.

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 13 March 1944.

Technical Manual 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces, War Department, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.15 March 1945.

FM 7-35, Tank Company, Infantry Regiment, Department of the Army, June 1949.

FM 7-17, The Armored Infantry Company and Battalion, Department of the Army, 23 March 1951.

FM 17-17, The Armored Infantry Company and Battalion, Department of the Army, 25 March 1951.

FM 17-77 Crew Drill, Armored Infantry Vehicle, Full Track M75, Department of the Army, 16 December 1953.

FM 17-1, Armor Operations, Small Units, Department of the Army, August 1957.

FM 17-20, Armored Infantry Units, Platoon, Company, and Battalion, Departmnent of the Army, August 1957.

FM 17-1, Armor Operations, Department of the Army, June 1963.

FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Department of the Army, 30 June 1977...

Training Circular 7-7-1, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon Squad [early doctrinal guidance on the M2/M3 Bradley], Department of the Army, 1982.

FM 7-7J, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley), Department of the Army, February 1986.

 

Articles

Birnstiel, Fritz, Maj. Gen., West German Army, "German Combat Troops in Action," Infantry, Vol. 67, No. 6, (November-December, 1977).

Dunaway, Roy S., Col., USA, "The Infantry Fighting Vehicle," Infantry, Vol. 67, No. 4, (July-August, 1977).

Doughty, Robert A., Maj, USA, and Holder, L. D., Maj., USA, Antitank Doctrine, Infantry, Vol. 66, No. 2, (March-April, 1976).

Florence, William D., Maj., USA, "Some Thought on What's Happened to the Mechanized Infantry, Armor, (March-April 1971).

Griest, R. "FVS - A True Mounted Infantry Combat System," International Defense Review, Special Series -6, (1978).

Humphrey, Vernon W., "Meeh Infantry - What Next?," Infantry, Vol. 61, No. 4, (July- August, 1971).

Karber, Phillip A., "The Soviet Antitank Debate," Armor, (November-December, 1976).

Karbeling, Emanuel, "MIC-V Update," Infantry, Vol. 64, No. 2, (March-April, 1974).

Kehoe, Thomas P., Capt., USA, "The M113 Armored Porcupine," Infantry, Vol. 56, No. 1, (January-February, 1966). [test of modified M113]

McCaslin, James K., Maj,.., USA, "The BMP in Combat," Infantry, Vol. 67, Bo. 1, (January-February, 1977).

Ney, Virgil, Col., USA, "The Evolution of the Armored Infantry Rifle Squad," Armor, (September-October, 1965).

Ogorkiewicz, Richard M., "The XM723 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle," International Defense Review, Special Series -6, (1978).

Ogorkiewicz, Richard M., "Infantry Combat Vehicles," Infantry, Vol. 60, No. 6, (January-Febryary, 1971).

Pickett, George B., Jr., Lt. Col., USA, "Armored Personnel Carriers," Armored Cavalry Journal, (May-June, 1949).

Pearson, David, Capt., USA, "Past, Present, and Future Ground Mobility," Infantry, Vol. 62, No. 2, (March-April, 1972).

Ritz, Alfred, Brig. Gen., West German Army, "Panzerqrenadiere: German Mechanized Infantry," Armor, (July-August, 1973).

Roseborough, Morgan G., Lt. CoL, USA, "Tin Can Doughboys," Armored Cavalry Journal, (March-April, 1949).

Smith, Donald B., Cpt, USA, "TOW in the 80's," Armor, (March-April, 1981).

Sullivan, Roy F., Lt. CoL, USA, "Muddling Along with the M113," Armor, (May-June, 1971).

Sullivan, Roy F., Lt. Col, USA, "Soviet APC's," Infantry, Vol. 61, No. 6, (Nov-Dec, 1971).

Turbiville, Graham H., "Soviet Infantry Assault Detachments," Infantry, Vol. 65, no. 5, (September-October, 1975).

 

Books

Crow, Duncan, ed. American AFVs of World War II. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972.

leks, Robert J., Lt. CoL, USA. Tanks and Armored Vehicles. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945.

Jane's Armour and Artillery 1984-85. New York: Jane's Publishing, Inc, 1986.

Ogorkiewicz, Richard M. Armor, A History of Mechanized Forces. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1960.

Simpkin, Richard E. Mechanized Infantry. New York: Brassey's Publishers Limited, 1980.

 

APPENDIX I

Selected U.S. Army Armored Infantry Vehicles

Year

System

Weight

Troops

Armament

1940

M3

15,000

3 + 10

.30 Cal. machine gun on pintle mount or .50 Cal. on ring mount; open top.

M44

2 + 24

1x.50 Cal. machine gun cupola mounted; 2x30. Cal., machine guns.

1951

M75

41,500

2 + 10

.50 Cal. machine gun on pintle mount.

1953

M59

42,600

2 + 10

.50 Cal. machine gun on pintle mount or in cupola.

1960

M113

22,600

2 + 10

.50 Cal. machine gun on pintle mount.

1965

XM701

54,050

3 + 10

20-mm cannon in two-man turret; firing ports.

1970

AIFV

27,000

3 + 7

25-mm cannon with coaxial 7.62- mm machine gun in one-man turret; firing ports.

1974

MICV

40,000

3 + 9

20-mm or 25-mm cannon with coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun in one-man turret; firing ports.

1981

M2

47,000

3 + 6

TOW missile under armor; 25-mm cannon with coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun in two-man turret; firing ports.

Note: "Year" reflects delivery of prototype or of first production model, if system was standardized. "Weight" is given in pounds. "Troops" reflects crew + infantrymen. Dismounted strength increases by one when the track commander / squad leader elects to dismount.

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX II

Selected French and German* Armored Infantry Vehicles

Year    System            Weight

Troops

Armament

1938    Sd.Kfz. 251*  17,000

2 + 10

2x7.92-mm machine guns on pintle mounts. Forward station protected by shield; opentop.

1940    Sd.Kfz. 250*  10,600

2+4

2x7.92-mm machine guns on pintle mounts. Forward station protected by shield; open top.

1957    AMXVCI       33,000

2 + 10

7.5-mm machine gun on pintle mount; later 7.62-mm machine gun in turret; firing ports.

SPZ 12-3*      32,700

2 + 6

20-mm cannon in one-man turret; 7.62-mm machine gun on pintle mount.

1971    Marder*          62,000

3+7

20-mm cannon with coaxial 7.62- mm machine gun externally mounted on top of two-man turret; remotely controlled 7.62- mm machine gun on rear deck; firing ports.

1973    AMX-10P       31,240

3+8

20-mm cannon with coaxial 7.62- mm machine gun in one- or two- man turret; firing ports.

Note: Asterisk designates German systems. SPZ 12-3 was also known as HS-30

 

APPENDIX III

Selected Soviet Armored Infantry Vehicles

Year

System

Weight

Troops

Armament

1950

BTR-152

19,600

2 + 17

3x7.62-mm machine guns or 2x7.62-mm machine guns and 1x12.7-mm machine gun; open top or closed with firing ports.

1951

BTR-40

11,700

2 + 8

1 x 7.62-mm machine gun on pintle mount; firing ports.

1957

BTR-50P

31,250

2 + 20

7.62-mm machine gun on pintle mount; open top.

1961

BTR-60PA

22,000

2 + 12

1x7.62-mm or 12.7-mm machine gun on pintle mount; firing ports.

BTR-60PB

22,700

2 + 8

14.5-mm machine gun and coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun in one-man turret; firing ports.

1967

BMP-1

29,700

3+8

AT-3 Sagger, later AT-4 Spigot anti­tank missile; 73-mm smooth bore gun with coaxial 7.62-mm machinegun in one-man turret; firing ports.

1970

BMD

14,750

3+4

Anti-tank missile; 73-mm smooth bore gun with coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun in one-man turret; 2x7.62-mm machine guns mounted in the bow.

1980

BTR-70

25,000

3 + 8

14.5-mm machine gun and coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun in one-man turret; firing ports.

1982

BMP-2

32,100

3 + 6

AT-5 Spandrel anti-tank missile; 30- mm cannon and coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun in two-man turret; firing ports.

Note: "Year" reflects the first public appearance of the system.

Комментариев нет:

Отправить комментарий